Scholars have criticized the
This essay suggests that constitutional tort claimants should be permitted to avoid the qualified immunity defense by pursuing claims for nominal damages alone. Such nominal claims have a lengthy pedigree, both as a common law analog to the declaratory judgment, and as a remedy for constitutional violations. Because they do not threaten to impose personal liability on official defendants, nominal claims should not give rise to a qualified immunity defense. By seeking only nominal relief, litigants could secure the vindication of their constitutional rights in cases where legal uncertainty might otherwise lead to a dismissal. Such a regime would advance the acknowledged interest in maintaining a vibrant body of constitutional law without threatening to impose ruinous liability on the officials named in the complaint.
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Yet personal liability also threatened the financial security of wellmeaning public officials. To moderate that threat, the Court hit upon a doctrine of qualified immunity. 5 to an objective inquiry into the clarity with which the constitutional rights in question were established. 7 Immunity's focus on the clarity of the legal norm transformed constitutional tort litigation. 8 Modern qualified immunity law now entails a two-step judicial inquiry: did the official violate the law and was that law articulated with the clarity needed to overcome the immunity defense.
9
This two-step inquiry confronts federal courts with a familiar dilemma. If the law's lack of clarity would support an immunity defense, the court can readily dispose of the case after reaching that conclusion. But such a disposition leaves the law unsettled; it fails to give future officials and the individuals with whom they deal a clear idea about what the law permits and forbids. 10 In other words, dispositions based on the law's lack of clarity serve the interest in minimalist decision-making and constitutional avoidance, but do little to clarify the law.
11
The Court's struggle to resolve this dilemma has given rise to a debate over what has come to be known as the order of battle in constitutional tort litigation.
12
The Court's first attempt to resolve the order-of-battle dilemma did not endure. In Saucier v. Katz, the Court insisted that lower courts address the constitutional issue first and only then decide if the law was well enough established to overcome official immunity. 13 But such enforced inquiries into the 7 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982) . On the difficulty of conducting this inquiry into the content of "clearly established" law, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., What's Wrong with Qualified Immunity, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 851, 854 (2010) (describing the doctrine as a source of "much confusion and instability"). 8 For example, the switch to an objective standard eventually led the Court to cast the burden of pleading immunity on the plaintiff. The plaintiff's obligation to plead a violation of clearly established law was clarified in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 Ct. , (2009 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (requiring that courts first reach the constitutional question and only then decide if the law was established with the clarity needed to overcome content of constitutional law encountered resistance from the lower courts. In addition, critics of the Saucier approach identified such concerns as the problem of advisory opinions, 14 the difficulty of addressing some novel constitutional issues, and the potentially awkward posture of cases awaiting further review at the Supreme Court. 15 The Court accordingly changed course. In Pearson v.
Callahan, the Court restored the lower courts' discretion to dismiss on legal uncertainty grounds without definitively resolving the constitutional claim. 16 Scholars have expressed concern that constitutional law will stagnate and that lower courts will struggle with the grant of standard-less discretion apparently recognized in Pearson. 17 Litigants, meanwhile, may find it difficult to secure a vindication of their rights, as the case of the Guantanamo detainees tends to confirm. 18 To be sure, qualified immunity). The Saucier regime was anticipated in such cases as Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) , where the Court emphasized the importance of reaching a decision on the merits to promote "clarity" for the "benefit of both the officers and the general public. Many constitutional tort plaintiffs face not a threatened or ongoing violation but a one-off event that affected them in the past and will not (under modern standing and ripeness decisions) support a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief. 23 For these plaintiffs, including Webster Bivens himself, damages provide the only possible remedy. 24 Extending qualified immunity can deprive individuals of their only effective mode of redress and their only opportunity for vindication.
To address the stagnation and vindication threats posed by qualified immunity, this brief essay suggests the revival of an old model of litigation: the suit for nominal damages. The suit for nominal damages arose at common law to enable litigants to secure the judicial resolution of a claim of right even in circumstances where the plaintiff did not seek, or could not establish a claim to, 19 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (concluding both that aliens at Guanatanamo Bay have a right to contest the legality of detention by way of habeas and that Congress acted unconstitutionally in immunizing executive detention from searching federal judicial review). 20 The suppression remedy has been undercut through the recognition of a good faith exception, but has not been overturned. 95 (1983) (allowing victim of police chokehold to sue for damages but not for injunctive relief against city policy); cf. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (rejecting pattern-or-practice challenge to the administration of city's criminal justice system on the basis of an apparent preference for case-by-case rather than systemic assessment). 24 In Justice Harlan's memorable phrase, it was "damages or nothing." Bivens, 403 U.S. at (Harlan, J., concurring). compensatory damages. 25 An award of nominal damages signified the invasion of a legal right in circumstances in which the plaintiff either failed to prove actual damages or chose to waive compensatory damages and pursue the nominal claim alone. In any case, the court had the power to adjudicate the legal question and award judgment. If the plaintiff was successful, the decision was entitled to preclusive effect and the defendant was obliged to pay the costs of the litigation.
26
With its emphasis on securing the resolution of a question of law, one can readily see why the suit for nominal damages has often been described as an early precursor to the declaratory judgment action.
27
Building on these early foundations, this essay proposes that Bivens and section 1983 litigants should be entitled to obtain a determination of their constitutional claims by initiating a suit for nominal damages against the responsible officer. 28 Although it would promise little by way of compensation, such a nominal damages claim could be an attractive option for plaintiffs who wish to secure judicial vindication. By expressly declaring in the complaint that they do not intend to seek and will not accept any compensatory or punitive damages, or an award of costs and attorney's fees (and thereby confining themselves to nominal damages alone), plaintiffs would waive the money damages aspect of constitutional tort litigation that threatens official defendants with personal liability. 29 By removing the threat of personal liability, and with it much of the justification for qualified immunity, the suit for nominal damages would allow the plaintiff to secure a constitutional decision even where the law was not clearly established.
30
Such an immunity-free nominal damages claim could contribute much to the clarity and flexibility of constitutional tort litigation. In a variety of cases involving unprecedented government wrongdoing, as with cases brought to challenge detention or torture at Guantanamo Bay, the suit for nominal damages would enable the federal courts to clarify the law without threatening the lowlevel (or high-level) officers who carried out the challenged policy. 31 A finding that the government violated the individual's constitutional rights would provide a measure of vindication, even if it did not provide make-whole relief. Moreover, the judicial inquiry in such cases could focus on the content of constitutional law rather than on the often-complex question whether the norms in question can be regarded as clearly established.
Recognition of an immunity-free constitutional tort action for nominal damages would closely resemble two well-established forms of constitutional litigation: habeas petitions to challenge the legality of custody and suits for 29 As noted above, that doctrine arose in the 1970s to protect government officials from the threat of personal liability that could dampen their willingness to enforce the law or accept government employment. The Court has expressed concern that the threat of liability "'will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.'" Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1977) (noting the importance of encouraging "the vigorous exercise of official authority"); cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of clearly established law in avoiding the unfairness of subjecting police officers to monetary liability for picking the wrong side in a controversy). 30 As explained below, the qualified immunity doctrine arose to protect officers sued in their personal capacity but was later expanded out of concern with the burdens associated with the litigation process. I evaluate the burden of litigation argument below. See part IIB. 31 Indeed, the Court has revitalized the immediate custodian rule in habeas litigation, ensuring that the nominal defendant in such actions will normally be the person directly in charge of the petitioner's confinement. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (reaffirming the longstanding, if episodically applied, requirements in habeas litigation that the petitioner pursue relief in the district of confinement and do so by action against the immediate custodian). Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that habeas puts into issue the legality of confinement decisions made at the highest levels of government and does not pose any threat to the officer named.
injunctive and declaratory relief against allegedly unconstitutional government policies. Both models of constitutional adjudication rest on the so-called Ex parte Young fiction and the notion that a suit brought against an officer in his official capacity puts into issue the legality and constitutionality of the government's conduct. 32 the legal question without any inquiry into whether the constitutional rule was clearly established.
36
The suit for nominal damages would resemble these proceedings in virtually every relevant respect. The officer would appear as a nominal defendant, facing liability on the order of $1.00. 37 The government would appear to defend the action, at least so long as the officer had acted in the course or scope of employment in pursuing allegedly unconstitutional conduct. 38 The judgment would bind the officer and would establish a binding precedent, helping to define the scope and limits of proper government action. 39 In the meantime, where 36 To be sure, the Court has held that habeas relief on post-conviction review of state criminal proceedings should be awarded only when the constitutional rule at issue was clearly established, a norm that was later enacted into positive law. 38 Federal regulations provide for the government to provide representation to officers named in their individual capacity, so long as the action arose from conduct that reasonably appears to have occurred "within the scope of the employee's employment" and the Attorney General or his designee determines that providing representation would otherwise be "in the interest of the United States." 28 C.F.R. 50.15(a). This duty to provide representation would attach to virtually all conceivable constitutional tort claims for nominal damages, which by definition seek to test the constitutionality of action taken by the government. Such claims will likely focus on the government policies and their application in the particular case and pose little threat that government officials will be viewed as having acted outside the scope and thereby obliged to shoulder the financial and emotional burden of arranging for their own defense. 39 The government might respond to nominal claims by refusing to defend the action and allowing a default judgment to enter against the defendant official. Such a strategy could result in the entry of a binding judgment, although the amount would be limited to the nominal sum of $1.00. By thus attempting to pretermit any judicial determination of the content of constitutional law, the government might attempt to draw the teeth from any such litigation. Yet three factors would seem to lessen the payoff to a government default strategy. First, the government might not be able to accept the political fallout associated with the entry of a default judgment in a highprofile case. (President Bill Clinton, for example, was reportedly advised to consider allowing a default judgment to enter against him in the Paula Jones litigation, but found it difficult advice to accept.) Second, the plaintiff might counter the possibility of default by seeking, in addition to nominal damages, a declaratory judgment to the effect that constitutional rights were violated. Such a request would presumably require the district court to enter the default under the Federal existing precedents formed a body of law that came to be regarded as clearly established within the meaning of qualified immunity law, victims could recover compensatory and punitive damages for a proven violation. Constitutional law could continue to evolve without a threat of stagnation, providing guidance to the government and public alike, and government officials would continue to enjoy immunity from personal liability except in cases where they violated clearly established norms.
This essay develops its proposal for the recognition of an immunity-free constitutional tort action for nominal damages in three short sections. Part I briefly traces the well-known problems with Bivens litigation, now compounded by restrictive approaches at both the right-of-action and qualified immunity phases of the analysis. Part II sets out the terms of the suggested action for nominal damages, drawing on the common law history of such proceedings, showing that claimants may seek such damages in modern constitutional tort litigation, and exploring the implications of such claims for the doctrine of qualified immunity. Part III seeks to allay predictable concerns and to describe unexpected benefits that might flow from the proposal. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE CHALLENGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Moreover, the rules prohibit the entry of any default judgment against the government or its officers unless the plaintiff "establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(e). The rules therefore provide the legal foundation for regarding any default judgment as an adjudication of the claim on the merits and minimizes the government's ability to deprive the judgment of any precedential effect. Some may worry that defendants could escape nominal litigation with an offer of judgment under Rule 68. Such offers put some pressure on litigants to settle by imposing the costs of litigation on any plaintiff that refuses to accept an offer and recovers a judgment of lesser value. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). Notably, plaintiffs in nominal litigation seek both an award of damages and a declaration that the plaintiff's rights were violated. Courts have recognized that such nonmonetary elements must be considered in determining whether the final judgment is more or less favorable than the offer. At least four important barriers confront the plaintiff seeking to impose constitutional tort liability on officers of the federal government. 40 First, the plaintiff must persuade the court to recognize the existence of a right of action.
41
Second, the plaintiff must overcome the predictable qualified immunity defense.
42
Third, the plaintiff must meet the more demanding plausibility pleading standard to which the Court gave voice in Twombly and Iqbal. 43 has long viewed denial of a qualified immunity defense as the sort of collateral order that qualifies for immediate appellate review. 45 Success on all these fronts may entitle the plaintiff to discovery and the possibility of a jury trial on liability. But other pitfalls await. If the plaintiff pursues an FTCA claim against the federal government, the judgment bar may preclude Bivens liability. 46 Finally, the plaintiff may have trouble collecting the judgment. The government takes the position that indemnity should not be made routinely available for officers subjected to personal liability under Bivens. As a result, the plaintiff cannot rely on the government to pay judgments obtained against its officials (even where they act within the course and scope of their employment). Indemnity requires an additional finding that payment would serve the interests of the government. 47 The Department of Justice does not make public any record of its administrative indemnity practice, perhaps in part due to a concern that litigants will come to rely on its availability in bringing suit against government officials.
48
Despite recent evidence of a somewhat surprising (and contested) success rate, 49 Bivens litigation has been singularly unsuccessful in securing a Cir. 2008 ) (vacating $6.5 million Bivens judgment under the terms of the judgment-bar doctrine after plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to impose liability on the government under the FTCA). The Court has yet to decide how broadly to apply the judgment bar to other Bivens litigation. Many Bivens litigants will file claims under the FTCA if only to trigger access to settlements payable from the Judgment Fund. In the Iqbal litigation itself, the complaint sought damages from high government officials on a Bivens theory, but was reportedly settled on the basis of FTCA claims. See generally James E. Pfander & Neil Aggarwal, Bivens, the Judgment Bar, and the Perils of Dynamic Textualism, __ St. Thomas L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2011) (arguing on textual and historical grounds that the FTCA's judgment bar does not apply to Bivens claims). 47 The Department of Justice takes the view that indemnity will normally be paid only after the entry of a Bivens judgment and only where a finding is made that the payment of indemnity will serve the best interests of the federal government. Moreover, it requires the personal approval of the Attorney General of the United States to approve an indemnity request in excess of $100,000. (In contrast, department heads can approve an FTCA settlement of $ 1 million.) Today's restrictive attitude towards indemnity represents a significant departure from the early days of the nineteenth century, when Congress, the executive, and the courts regarded the federal government as duty-bound to indemnify federal officials for any liability imposed on them in their personal capacity while acting in the course and scope of employment. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 3, at __. 48 For an account of the government's indemnity practices, see Cornelia Pillard, ( 
II. THE ELEMENTS OF AN IMMUNITY-FREE NOMINAL CLAIM
In suggesting greater reliance on suits for nominal damages, this essay proposes to revive a mode of redress that has deep roots in the common law and a long history of acceptance in constitutional tort litigation. In this part, the essay sketches the broad acceptance of nominal damages, and then explains why such a claim, standing alone, should not give rise to a qualified immunity defense. 61 Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to presumed damages for the wrongful suspension, even in the absence of proof that they suffered injury as a consequence of the deprivation. Building on their broad acceptance as a remedy for constitutional torts, this essay suggests that a constitutional tort claim may proceed solely as an action for nominal damages. The plaintiff would simply announce in her complaint that, in suing for a constitutional violation, she seeks only to recover nominal damages and waives any claim for compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney's fees. A commitment to accept only nominal damages would clarify both to the government official named as the nominal defendant and to the government agency whose action the suit draws into question that the proceeding does not threaten to impose any personal financial liability. As a result, the agency and the official could treat the proceeding much the same way they would treat a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against an ongoing constitutional violation. 68 The resulting proceedings pose no threat of loss to the named official and do not give rise to a qualified immunity defense. 69 The litigation would seek long ago decided that, at a minimum, a plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation is entitled to nominal damages."); Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir.2000) (stating that "a § 1983 plaintiff whose constitutional rights are violated is entitled to receive nominal damages even if he fails to produce any evidence of compensatory damages"). 67 Courts have, to be sure, occasionally found that a violation was too slight or technical to warrant an award of nominal damages, a conclusion consistent with the common law doctrine of de minimis non curat lex. 68 The Court recently confirmed that the standard for municipal liability under section 1983 does not depend on the nature of the relief sought. See Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. __ (2010) (concluding that suits for declaratory relief, like those for monetary damages, must establish that a county policy or custom violates the Constitution). In addressing the substantive standard for county liability, the Court relied on settled law and had no occasion to discuss qualified immunity. 69 Officials named as defendants in actions for injunctive relief may be subject to contempt sanctions if they violate the terms of the injunction. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (upholding a contempt sanction against a state official who violated an injunction). Such sanctions might threaten a form of personal liability.
to clarify the constitutional norm and would not address whether the norm in question had been clearly established in earlier litigation. 70 Such a stand-alone action for nominal damages would represent something of a novelty in constitutional tort litigation. But the proceeding has a fairly strong foundation in existing law. First, it has long been settled that a claimant may waive or forgo claims for compensatory and punitive damages and pursue nominal damages alone. 71 Second, the decision of the plaintiff to waive all but nominal damages does not call into doubt the existence of a genuine case or controversy within the meaning of Article III; courts treat an action for nominal damages as a live dispute that satisfies the requirements of justiciability. 72 Third, courts have regarded the judgments rendered in such proceedings as binding, according them both stare decisis and claim preclusive effect.
73
These conclusions cohere with the notion that an action for nominal damages was in 70 Such an approach would resemble that followed in the early Republic, when courts passed upon legal issues without inquiring into the good faith of the officer. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 3, at 1922-29. 71 See Daniels v. Bates, 2 Greene 151, (Iowa 1849) (upholding the right of the plaintiff to waive any claim for compensatory damages and seek only nominal damages "as a self-evident proposition, too obvious to be questioned," even where such waiver defeats the defendant's right to recover the cost of improvements by way of set-off); High v. Johnson, 28 Wis. 72, (1871) (allowing plaintiff to waive claim to actual damages and secure a nominal verdict from jury that found an invasion of plaintiff's legal rights); Boon v. Juliet, 1 Scam. 258, 2 Ill. 258 (1836) (upholding right of the plaintiff to waive an inquest to ascertain damages and to take judgment for nominal damages alone); Connecticut & P.R.R. Co many respects an early precursor to the declaratory judgment proceeding and was recognized as such. 74 Today, no one questions the power of the federal courts to declare the rights of the parties in a case of actual controversy.
75

B. Nominal Damages and Qualified Immunity
Although the viability of constitutional tort claims for nominal damages seems beyond dispute, the key to this essay's proposal lies in its suggestion that such claims should not give rise to a qualified immunity defense. That argument may strike some readers as self-evident; the Court created official immunities for the express purpose of providing officers with protection from personal liability and the actions under consideration pose no real threat of such liability. 76 But several factors complicate the straightforward claim that the personal liability origins of qualified immunity make the doctrine inapplicable to nominal claims. raised by this essay's proposal, 79 they provide some support for the doctrine's application. 80 In addition, the doctrine of qualified immunity has evolved from its origins as a protection against personal liability. In later decisions, the Court broadened the immunity to protect the officer from the burden of trial, rather than just the threat of liability.
81
To the extent the action for nominal damages implicates the Court's burden-of-litigation rationale, such actions may trigger the 79 See cases cited in note 78 supra. Notably, in all these cases, the plaintiffs sought compensatory or punitive damages or both in addition to the nominal claims. As a consequence, the lower federal courts treated the claims as posing a genuine threat of personal liability and reflexively assumed that the doctrine of qualified immunity applied. The decisions shed little light on the qualified immunity consequences of an action that announces, at the outset, a waiver of all damages other than the nominal. immunity defense. Finally, the Court's recent hostility to Bivens litigation might lead some to predict that, with whatever doctrinal justification, it will reflexively extend immunity defenses to nominal claims. 82 But the Court's qualified immunity decisions do not all point in one direction. Thus, the Court has rejected the government's argument for an absolute immunity from liability, emphasizing the Marbury principle of assured remediation. Similarly, the Court has refused to broaden interlocutory review of rejected qualified immunity claims, recognizing that immunity must occasionally give way to other values. 83 Indeed, on looking beneath the surface of the Court's judge-made immunity law, 84 the decisions reveal three leading principles: (i) the doctrine should preserve some meaningful opportunity for the victims of constitutional wrongdoing to obtain a vindication of their rights; (ii) the doctrine should protect officers and government agencies from some (but not all) of the burdens associated with constitutional litigation; and (iii) the doctrine should avoid stagnation by giving federal courts an opportunity to reach the merits of a reasonable number of constitutional tort claims. One finds these principles reflected in such leading decisions as Butz v. Economou, 85 Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
86
Saucier v. Katz, 87 and Pearson v. Callahan.
88
The Butz decision nicely illustrates the Court's devotion to the preservation of some reasonable opportunity for individuals to vindicate their constitutional rights. There, the Court considered a claim that the former secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, violated the constitutional rights of Arthur Economou, a commodities dealer, by approving his suspension from trading in a regulated futures market. The government argued that Butz, as a Cabinet level official, should be given absolute immunity from suit, but the Court opted instead for a qualified immunity that was said to depend on the clarity with which constitutional rights were established and the evidence that the official defendant acted in good faith. As Justice White explained, the Court could find no reason for giving federal officers greater immunity from a Bivens claim than state officers enjoy from suit under section 1983. 89 Indeed, the Bivens right of action would be "drained of meaning" if officers were accorded an absolute immunity.
90
If Butz emphasizes the Marbury principle of assured remediation, 91 then
Harlow v. Fitzgerald reflects the Court's willingness to tailor immunity to offer a greater measure of protection to government officials sued in their personal capacity. 92 Early versions of official immunity in the 1970s offered protection to officers who acted in good faith within the limits of their authority. The Court justified these early versions by highlighting the potential unfairness of imposing liability in cases where official duties require officers to exercise discretion and the concern that liability would deter the officer from acting with the decisiveness required by the public good. 93 Later, the Court recognized that the focus on the official's good faith created a factual issue that often required the officer to submit to trial. To address that concern, the Harlow Court switched to an objective standard of immunity that would facilitate the entry of summary judgment. 94 In justifying its switch, the Court emphasized such "social costs" as "the expenses of litigation." 95 The Court expanded on the burden of litigation rationale in Mitchell v. Forsyth, allowing a Cabinet official to seek interlocutory appellate review of the denial of a qualified immunity defense. 96 At least for purposes of interlocutory review in the federal system, qualified immunity was to be regarded as an "immunity from trial" rather than simply an immunity from liability. 97 A third concern in the Court's management of qualified immunity has been to preserve the law-saying function of the federal courts. 98 In Saucier v.
Katz, the Court emphasized the concern with the preservation of the common law function of courts in elaborating the rules of constitutional law. 99 It did so, as we have seen, by inflexibly mandating a two-step decision rule that requires the trial court, when faced with an immunity defense, first to determine whether the facts alleged make out a constitutional violation and only then to determine whether the constitutional law in question has been established with the clarity needed to overcome qualified immunity. 100 Such a merits-first order of battle was said to enable the federal courts "to elaborate the constitutional right with greater degrees of specificity." 101 It operated to limit the frequent tendency of lower courts to avoid the constitutional claim at issue by pointing to conflicting authority and concluding that the law lacked the clarity necessary to overcome the official's Harlow immunity.
More recently, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court abandoned the inflexible Saucier order of battle and substituted a regime of discretion under which lower courts can reach the merits, if they choose, or resolve the case on the basis of a lack of clarity. 102 In doing so, the Pearson Court expressed concern with some consequences of Saucier's inflexibility but reaffirmed the general value of enabling the lower courts to develop the law. 103 The Court specifically called attention to the need for such development in cases that do not frequently arise; 104 simple scarcity alone might prevent the development of a body of law well enough established to provide guidance to officials and protection to the victims of alleged wrongdoing.
105
Applying the principles in these leading cases, one can make a strong if not altogether airtight argument that the defense of qualified immunity should not apply to suits brought for nominal damages. For starters, the action for nominal damages (if allowed to proceed in the absence of clearly established law) should facilitate judicial resolution of constitutional claims, serving the Butz interest in the vindication of constitutional rights. Plaintiffs are likely to pursue such claims in two situations: when they believe that their rights have been violated and they have suffered only a modest or symbolic injury and, in cases of more substantial injury, when they predict that the unsettled quality of constitutional law would prevent them from overcoming the otherwise applicable qualified immunity defense. By allowing the plaintiff to waive the more substantial claim for damages in order to secure the adjudication of the constitutional claim in a world of uncertainty, the proposal would help to clarify and vindicate constitutional norms. Litigants such as Jose Padilla (whose claim against John Yoo remains pending) and Valerie Plame Wilson (whose action against Dick Cheney was dismissed), might have both been willing to forgo claims for compensatory damages in an effort to secure constitutional vindication.
106
103 Id. at 818-22. 104 Id. at 818. 105 The desire to provide guidance to officials has long been a feature of the Court's immunity analysis. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (explaining that the merits-first order of battle would promote "clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public"). By encouraging the adjudication of the merits of unsettled constitutional claims, the action for nominal damages would also advance the Saucier/Pearson interest in the articulation and clarification of constitutional norms. As noted above, the Pearson Court continued to emphasize the importance of clarifying constitutional law when possible, even as it recognized that lower courts should have discretion to resolve the issue on the basis that the constitutional norm at issue was not well enough established to permit an award of damages. Despite the Court's protestations, critics worry that the new discretionary regime will create renewed problems of stagnation. 107 Empirical work to date tends to bear out this concern. 108 The action for nominal damages offers one solution to the stagnation problem. It would oblige district courts to reach the merits of the constitutional claim even in cases of legal uncertainty, so long as the plaintiff agreed to forgo all but a nominal award.
Finally, by limiting the award to one dollar in nominal damages, the proposal would not pose the threat of ruinous personal liability that gives rise to the qualified immunity defense. Not only does Carey limit the award of nominal damages to one dollar, the law has pretty clearly settled the proposition that a successful proceeding for nominal damages does not give rise to an award of attorney's fees. For starters, successful Bivens claimants have no statutory right to an award of attorney's fees if they prevail. Even as to constitutional tort claims brought under section 1983, where fee awards are possible, the Court has held that recovery of an award of nominal damages alone does not entitle the plaintiff to significant attorney's fees. 109 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 underscores this conclusion, limiting successful litigants to a fee no greater than 1.5 times the award of damages. PLRA plaintiffs who have recovered nominal damages of $1.00 often receive attorney's fees of $1.50. 110 In any case, plaintiffs could presumably waive costs and attorney's fees in the same way that they waive all but nominal damages.
The nominal constitutional tort claim thus strikes a balance among the various policy considerations that inform the Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence. With the threat of liability eliminated, the nominal claim does not threaten the financial prospects of hard-working government employees. At the same time, the nominal claim will permit courts to vindicate constitutional rights and clarify the law, thus avoiding the concern with stagnation that remains in the wake of Pearson v. Callahan. Nonetheless, one can predict some hostility to the nominal Bivens claim both from the federal government and from courts disinclined to reach the merits of a complex constitutional case at the behest of a plaintiff seeking one dollar. The next part addresses these concerns.
III. SOME REALISM ABOUT NOMINAL CLAIMS 111
Despite its doctrinal bona fides, one suspects that the federal government will not welcome the recognition of an immunity-free nominal constitutional tort claim. The Supreme Court may share the government's skepticism to some degree, at least judging by a string of recent pro-government decisions. 
Iqbal.
114 One might predict that, with whatever doctrinal justification, the Court will incline toward the government's opposition to any development aimed at facilitating constitutional tort litigation. This part of the essay evaluates the likely contours of nominal tort litigation and explains why such claims should not trigger a skeptical response.
A. Understanding the Likely Contours of Nominal Constitutional Tort Litigation
Who will bring a nominal constitutional tort claim? Under the terms of the proposal in this essay, the complaint must clearly state that the plaintiff wishes to pursue a claim for nominal damages alone and must waive any claim to compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney's fees. The required waiver of damages, costs and fees will doubtless limit the universe of prospective claimants. As a practical matter, individuals who have suffered substantial physical, psychological, or dignitary injuries as the result of allegedly unconstitutional conduct will find the pursuit of nominal damages unattractive. The waiver of compensatory and punitive damages would eliminate the prospect of any significant recovery and, with it, the services of contingency fee lawyers. Plaintiffs who wish to pursue a claim for substantial damages will predictably take their chances with the qualified immunity defense or assert immunity-free claims under the FTCA or both.
115
Some federal prisoners will doubtless pursue nominal claims, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, religious discrimination, and a range of other claims. 116 happened as a factual matter. Was the prisoner beaten, or merely restrained? Had the prisoner engaged in conduct justifying some form of physical restraint, or did the prison guard act in retaliation or for other unconstitutional reasons? In factually rich cases, where questions of degree and motive take center stage, the plaintiff would gain little by trying to side-step qualified immunity through the assertion of a nominal claim. Qualified immunity has little relevance to such claims; much turns on whether the prisoner can produce sufficient factual support to create an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. 117 As a result, one can predict that the nominal claim will have limited appeal for many pro se litigants. If the prisoner succeeds in showing an unprovoked physical assault, the guard will face personal liability. Prisoners would gain little in such cases by agreeing at the outset to pursue only nominal claims.
The government might nonetheless worry that eliminating the qualified immunity defense would invite more prisoner claims and would make existing claims more difficult to defend. While some change in the mix of cases may result, two factors will limit the degree to which the recognition of a nominal Bivens claim will invite new, unwarranted prison litigation. First, the PLRA already puts in place a number of reforms aimed at curtailing frivolous prison litigation. 118 These include the required payment of a filing fee, the three strikes provision, the exhaustion requirement, and the required judicial screening that leads to the dismissal of many petitions at the threshold. 119 Second, prisoners subject to ongoing confinement can already pursue claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. 120 As we have seen, such Ex parte Young-style claims trigger an adjudication of the constitutional merits without regard to any qualified immunity defense. Recognition of a nominal Bivens claim would occasion little expansion in this category of litigation.
To be sure, the proposal would allow some former detainees to press claims for nominal damages that they could not (on standing grounds) pursue as 117 See Reinert, supra note 2, at 843-44 (observing that qualified immunity defenses play a more modest role in the dismissal of Bivens claims than previously believed and hypothesizing that much Bivens litigation arises in the context of well-established law). 118 For a summary of PLRA restrictions on prison litigation, see . 119 See Reinert, supra note 2, at 840 (reporting that 20% of the Bivens claim examined in the study were dismissed at the screening stage and thus imposed only a modest litigation burden on the government or the official named as a defendant so only when they confront either an absence of law or some disagreement among the lower federal courts. Such claims, though uncommon, seem especially likely to provide a useful source of law-clarification.
What's more, the unsettled quality of the law should not unduly complicate the litigation process. Discovery may, of course, be necessary to the determination of constitutional claims and discovery will impose burdens on both the plaintiff and the government official. But the government can still pursue summary dismissal of the claim either at the pleading or summary judgment stage on the theory that the plaintiff has failed to set out or support the elements of a viable constitutional claim. Notably, the Iqbal pleading regime would plainly apply to nominal constitutional tort claims, thus assuring the government a fairly rich factual record on which to base its motions to dismiss.
B. Counter-Intuitive Advantages and Concerns
Despite its many appealing features and its tendency to pose only a modest threat to federal dockets, recognition of a nominal constitutional tort claim may produce some unexpected consequences that deserve consideration. Counterintuitively, some supporters of constitutional litigation may worry about the impact of a nominal option on the development of qualified immunity law. The worry might run something like this: courts will view straight Bivens litigation for compensatory and punitive damages with an even more skeptical eye, taking the position that doubtful claims should be resolved through nominal litigation rather than through the threat of personal liability. On this view, critics may worry that plaintiffs will find it even more difficult to obtain compensation for constitutional torts than they do at present. In other words, if the Supreme Court were to confirm the nominal option for plaintiffs, the federal courts may come to regard that option as the preferred mode of constitutional litigation and look with disfavor on other options.
I share this concern to some degree and the perception that the law of qualified immunity now makes it too difficult to secure a vindication of constitutional rights. I also agree that the law in this area errs in providing too little protection for plaintiffs rather than in casting too great a burden on the government. If I were invited to suggest a legislative solution to the current imbalance, I would not too quickly embrace the expansion of nominal litigation as a tool to overcome qualified immunity. It might make more sense to tackle qualified immunity directly and to improve the effectiveness of the system of indemnification. Nominal damage claims thus represent something of a stopgap measure, responsive to the desire for law-clarification at a time when the Court appears unlikely to rethink its broad, and perhaps still growing, doctrine of qualified immunity.
Reliance on nominal damages might lead to a modest but unexpected reduction in the burden of constitutional tort litigation by shifting the focus away from high-ranking officers to the low-level officials who carried out the contested policy. Such a model of low-level litigation now prevails in the habeas context, where the Court's immediate custodian rule serves to focus litigation at the warden level even as it facilitates a full inquiry into the legality of the government's contested custody policy. 122 The Court has suggested that it would prefer such a focus in the Bivens context as well; indeed, its recent decision in Iqbal v. Ashcroft may make it more difficult to impose liability on supervisory officials. 123 Despite Iqbal, in the current world of Bivens litigation, supervisory and Cabinet-level officials remain relatively attractive defendants; they're more likely than low-level counterparts to have substantial personal assets with which to pay any eventual judgment and thus more likely to respond to settlement pressure. Nominal claims do not seek to impose substantial personal liability and thus tend to make the low-level and high-level officials equally attractive as potential defendants. While politically motivated claimants may continue to target high-level defendants, the economics of nominal litigation could offer a modest corrective to this tendency. finding of liability suggests an invasion of rights for which some form of compensation or reparation would be appropriate. Congress has made reparations payments in the past, perhaps most notably to the Japanese Americans who were interned during World War II. Successful nominal claimants might mount a similar claim for some form of recompense. (Needless to say, Congress would make any such payments in its discretion from the US Treasury; the possibility would not undermine the immunity-free quality of the nominal claim.)
If successful, such an appeal to Congress would, to some extent, return the law of government accountability to its early nineteenth century roots. As I have explored in another context, the early Republic had a fairly clear division of responsibility: courts were to evaluate the legality of government conduct (without regard to the clarity with which they had previously articulated the applicable principle of law) and Congress was in charge of ensuring that victims received compensation and officers were protected from personal liability.
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Congress accomplished this goal through the adoption of private bills of indemnity running in favor of the officer or the victim, whichever had borne the loss. 125 No one today (perhaps especially the members of Congress who would bear responsibility for the legislation) would welcome reliance on Congress for the case-by-case compensation of victims of federal government misconduct. But a practice of petitioning might persuade Congress to transfer responsibility for compensation to the federal courts.
126
IV. CONCLUSION
One can certainly sympathize with the government's perception that Bivens litigation serves more often to harass than to edify. One can also see that Pearson v. Callahan and the doctrine of qualified immunity will pose an important challenge to the ability of plaintiffs to secure an adjudication of their constitutional claims. In suggesting a new model of nominal constitutional tort litigation, this short essay seeks to clear the way for the assertion of a nominal claim that will broaden the law-saying power of the federal courts without posing a threat to well-meaning government officials. While it will not appeal to all 124 See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 3, at . 125 Id. at (describing Congress's willingness to structure payments directly to victims when the officer had disappeared or become insolvent). 126 Congress adopted both the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act in part to shift the responsibility for passing upon public claims to the courts. plaintiffs, the proposal will allow individuals to secure an adjudication of constitutional claims in a world of legal novelty or uncertainty. It thus offers one way to achieve what the Court has long described as the proper balance between the vindication of constitutional rights and the protection of those who act on behalf of the government.
